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Enrique V. Iglesias 
Executive Secretary, ECLA 
In this article, the Executive Secretary of ECLA gives an 
overview of the evolution of the region's economy 
during the past year, looking at production, employ-
ment, inflation, and especially the external sector. 
In his 'Final Conclusions', the author notes that the 
profound crisis through which the countries of Latin 
America are passing has forced them to apply adjust-
ment policies aimed at bringing the external sector 
back into balance. The economic and social conse-
quences of these policies have been exaggerated, 
however, by the fact that they have had to be carried 
out at a time of worldwide recession, they have been 
accompanied by a massive contraction in the net inflow 
of capital, and they are based on instruments which 
reduce demand and fail to take advantage of national 
production capacity. 
In order to reverse these trends, the countries 
should orient their policies towards an 'expansive 
adjustment' based on a solid process of reactivation. 
Among the main factors conditioning the achievement 
of this objective, the author mentions the refinancing 
of the external debt, the evolution of external trade 
(both within the region and with the rest of the world), 
the reduction of inflationary pressures, and the re-
structuring of growth patterns to strengthen produc-
tion and export capacity (in this respect, see the Quito 
Declaration and Plan of Action reproduced elsewhere 
in this issue of C;EPAI. Review). 
The author stresses that in tackling these condi-
tions it is necessary to review both old ideas and some 
newer ones. With regard to the latter, he reminds 
readers of the serious consequences brought about by 
strategies based on extensive financial and trade links 
with the exterior when the international parameters 
underwent a sudden and prolonged change. 
I 
Introduction 
The economic evolution of Latin America in 
1983 was characterized by two main features. 
The first was the aggravation of the crisis which 
began in 1981 and which by 1982 had become 
the most serious one experienced since the Great 
Depression of the 1930s. The second was the 
remarkable effort made by most of the countries 
of the region to reduce the serious imbalances 
that had been building up in the external sector 
over the last few years. 
In 1983, as in 1982, the crisis affected almost 
every country of the region and was evidenced in 
the deterioration of the main economic indica-
tors. Thus, according to the preliminary esti-
mates available to ECLA, which are shown in table 
1, the gross domestic product of Latin America 
as a whole dropped by 3.3%, after having already 
decreased by 1% in 1982; as a result of this drop 
and of population growth, the per capita product 
fell by 5.6% in the region as a whole and declined 
in 17 of the 19 countries for which comparable 
information is available. 
Inconsequence of this downward movement 
and of the fact that it had also fallen during the 
two preceding years, the per capita product of 
Latin America was almost 10% lower in 1983 
than in 1980 and was back at the level the region 
had reached in 1977. National per capita income 
dropped even more sharply (-5.9%), as 1983 
brought a further deterioration, for the third 
year in a row, of the terms of trade for the region 
as a whole, and, for the sixth year in a row, of the 
terms of trade of the non-oil-exporting Latin 
American countries. The terms of trade for the 
latter showed a total decline of 38% by compari-
son with 1977 and, for the second year in a row, 
sank even below the level reached during the 
worst times of the Great Depression. 
The slowdown of economic activity was 
accompanied by a new rise in urban unemploy-
ment rates in almost every country for which 
relatively reliable data are available. In spite of 
this, inflation accelerated spectacularly, as it had 
over the last three years, reaching record highs. 
The simple average rate of increase of consumer 
prices climbed from 47% in 1982 to 68% in 1983 
and the rate weighted by population soared even 
more sharply, from 86% in 1982 to 130% in 
1983. 
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In its turn, the extraordinary effort made by 
the region to adjust tp these problems was re-
flected in radical changes in the external sector. 
Thus, in 1983 Latin America achieved an unpre-
cedented merchandise trade surplus. Merchan-
dise trade, which up to 1981 had regularly shown 
a negative balance, but which by 1982 had re-
corded a surplus of over US$ 9.7 billion, gener-
ated a surplus of almost US$ 31.2 billion in 1983 
(see figure 1). This surplus was exclusively due, 
however, to a new and spectacular drop in the 
value of imports of goods, which went down by 
Table 1 
LATIN AMERICA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS" 
Gross domestic product at market 
prices (billions of 1970 dollars) 
Population (millions of inhabitants) 
Per capita gross domestic product 
(1970 dollars) 
Per capita gross national income 
(1970 dollars) 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Per capita gross national income 
Consumer prices1 
Terms of trade (goods) 
Current value of exports of goods 
Current value of imports of goods 
Exports of goods 
Imports of goods 
Trade balance (goods) 
Net profit and interest payments 
Balance on currents account*1 
Net capital movement 
Global balancef 













































































































- 0 . 9 
- 2 . 4 
60.8 
















- 1 . 0 
- 3 . 3 
- 4 . 8 
85.6 
- 7 . 0 















- 3 . 3 
- 5 . 6 
- 5 . 9 
130.4 
- 7 . 2 






- 8 . 5 
4.5 
- 4 . 0 
309.8 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of official figures. 
a
 Product, population and income figures refer to the group formed by the countries included in table 2, except Cuba. 
Consumer price figures refer to those 19 countries plus Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, 
except in the year 1982, when Guyana is excluded, and in 1983, when Guayana and Haiti are excluded. The figures 
for the external sector relate to those 19 countries plus Barbados, Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago, except for the 
figures on the external debt, which relate to the original 19 countries plus Guyana. 
b
 Provisional estimates subject to revision. 
c
 Variation from December to December. 
d
 Includes net unrequited private transfer payments. 
e
 Includes long- and short-term capital, unrequited official transfer payments, and errors and omissions. 
' Variation in international reserves (with inverted sign) plus counterpart entries. 
« 1975 to 1980: includes officially guaranteed public and private external debt, plus non-guaranteed long- and 
short-term debt with financial institutions reporting to the Bank for International Settlements. Does not include 
guaranteed and non-guaranteed debt with other commercial banks nor non-guaranteed supplier loans. 1981 to 
1983: includes official estimates of the total external debt, which means that the figures have a wider coverage and 
are not strictly comparable with those of the previous period. 
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Figure 1 
LATIN AMERICA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of official information. 
3
 Annual growth rate. 
b
 Weighted percentage variation from December to December. 
c
 Includes short-, medium- and long-term capital, unrequited official transfer payments and errors and 
omissions. 
d
 Billions of dollars. 
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close to 29% after having fallen by 20% in 1982. 
So unheard-of a reduction in foreign purchases 
was both an effect and a cause of the shrinkage of 
domestic economic activity, and reflected the ex-
ceptionally strict adjustment policies applied in 
many countries. 
The value of exports of goods, on the other 
hand, decreased slightly, even though the 
volume of exports rose by 7% in the region as a 
whole and by 9% in the non-oil-exporting coun-
tries. 
Net remittances for profits and interest also 
went down, so that the exceptionally high rate of 
growth of previous years was halted. These pay-
ments, which between 1977 and 1982 had shot 
up more than fourfold, from US$ 8.6 billion to 
US$ 36.8 billion, diminished to somewhat under 
US$ 34 billion in 1983. Nevertheless, since the 
value of exports fell at the same time, payments 
of interest and profits were still equivalent to 
almost 39% of external sales of goods. As a result 
of the changes in merchandise trade and in re-
mittances of profits and interest, and of the con-
siderable decrease in net payments for services, 
the deficit on current account plummeted from 
US$ 36.4 billion in 1982 to under US$ 8.5 billion 
in 1983, thus reaching the lowest level since 
1974. This exceptional reduction of the deficit 
on current account was accompanied and to 
1. Production and employment 
The slowdown of the Latin American economy, 
which had already been evident in the two pre-
ceding years, was even more pronounced in 
1983. After having risen by only 1.5% in 1981 
—the lowest growth rate since 1940— and fallen 
by 1% in 1982, the region's gross domestic 
product dropped by 3.3% in 1983 (see table 2). 
As a result of this unprecedented reduction 
of economic activity and of population growth, 
the per capita product fell for the third year in 
some extent caused by a no less drastic shrinkage 
of the net inflow of capital. This item, which in 
1982 had already been halved, after having 
reached a record high of US$ 38 billion in 1981, 
again dropped sharply in 1983, amounting to 
not even as much as US$ 4.5 billion. 
Because of this pronounced contraction in 
the net movement of loans and investments, and 
despite the substantial reduction of the negative 
balance on current account, the balance of pay-
ments closed with a deficit of almost US$ 4 bil-
lion; although this was much lower than the 
US$ 19.8 billion recorded in 1982, it represented 
a new and dangerous drain on Latin America's 
international reserves. As had already been the 
case in 1982, the abrupt decline of the net inflow 
of capital meant that much less capital came in 
than was paid out for interest and profits. Conse-
quently, Latin America, which up to 1981 had 
received a net transfer of real resources from 
abroad, in 1983 made a net transfer of resources 
to the rest of the world of almost US$ 30 billion. 
Also in consequence of the decrease in the 
net inflow of capital, the growth rate of external 
debt slackened for the second year in succession, 
falling to 7%, which was a good deal lower than 
the 12% growth rate of 1982 and far below the 
23% rate recorded, on average, between 1977 
and 1981. 
succession, at a much higher rate (—5.6%) than 
in 1981 (-l%)andl982(-3.3%). Consequently, 
the per capita product was almost 10% lower in 
1983 than in 1980. 
The exceptional intensity of the decline in 
economic activity over the last three years was 
also reflected in decreases in the per capita 
product of a number of Latin American coun-
tries. During this period, the per capita product 
diminished by over 20% in El Salvador, Bolivia 
and Costa Rica; by over 15% in Uruguay and 
Peru; by over 14% in Chile; by around 14% in 
II 
Main trends 
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Table 2 
LATIN AMERICA: EVOLUTION OF GLOBAL GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, 
1970-1974 TO 1981-1983 
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- 9 . 1 
1.1 
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- 5 . 2 
- 3 . 5 
0.3 
- 0 . 6 
- 0 . 5 
-1 .4 
5.5 
- 2 . 0 
0.4 
1,6 
- 8 . 7 
0.6 
- 1 . 0 
1983" 
2.0 
- 6 . 0 
- 5 . 0 
0.5 
- 0 . 5 
4.0 
- 0 . 5 
- 3 . 5 
- 1 . 5 
- 2 . 5 
- 0 . 5 
- 0 . 5 
- 4 . 0 
2.0 
0.5 
- 1 . 5 
-12 .0 
4.0 
- 5 . 5 
- 2 . 0 
- 3 . 3 
1981-
1983a6 
- 9 . 0 
-15 .7 




- 9 . 9 
2,5 
-15 .4 
- 4 . 9 









- 2 . 8 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of official statistics. 
" Provisional estimates subject to revision. 
b
 Cumulative variation for the period. 
c
 Refers to the concept of global social product. 
d
 Relates to the period 1971-1974. 
c
 Average excluding Cuba. 
Argentina and Guatemala; by almost 12% in 
Brazil; and by slightly over 10% in Venezuela 
and Honduras (see table 3). 
Furthermore, as in 1982, the downturn in 
economic activity was widespread. Indeed, the 
gross domestic product dropped in 14 of the 19 
countries for which comparable information is 
available, remained virtually at a standstill in two 
of them, and rose slightly in the other three. In 
'The concept of global social product used in Cuban 
statistics is equivalent to the sum of gross production in the 
agricultural, industrial, mining, energy, transport, com-
munications and trade sectors. 
addition, in Cuba the global social product in-
creased by around 4%' {see table 2). 
Nevertheless, in constrast to what happened 
in 1982, the decline in the product of the region 
as a whole in 1983 was due in particular to the 
highly unfavourable trend in productive activity 
in Brazil and Mexico, which are by far the two 
largest economies in Latin America. 
In Brazil —which alone generates around 
one-third of the total domestic product of the 
region— overall economic activity contracted by 
around 5%, after having expanded marginally in 
1982. This slump, which is without precedent in 
the last fifty years of Brazil's economic growth, 
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Table 3 
LATIN AMERICA: EVOLUTION OF PER CAPITA GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT3 
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-11 .5 
-1 .2 
- 1 . 0 
-11 .4 
- 1 5 . 8 
-1 .7 
- 8 . 0 
- 6 . 3 
-2 .1 
- 4 . 0 
- 3 . 1 
- 4 . 6 
3,2 
- 4 , 9 
-2 .2 
- 0 . 8 
- 9 . 3 
- 2 . 7 






- 1 . 6 
- 2 . 9 
-2 .2 
- 6 . 3 
- 4 . 3 
- 5 . 1 
- 3 . 1 
- 3 . 7 
- 6 . 4 
- 1 . 4 
- 1 . 7 
- 4 . 6 
-14 .3 
1.6 
- 6 . 3 
- 5 . 2 






- 2 . 7 
-20 .1 
-14 .3 
- 6 . 7 
-22 .4 
-12 .9 
- 7 . 2 
-10 .3 
- 4 . 8 
- 0 . 9 
3.5 





- 9 . 5 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of official statistics. 
a
 At market prices. 
b
 Provisional estimates subject to revision. 
r
 Cumulative variations for the period. 
was due, in particular, to the new and sharp 
reduction in the volume of imports and the se-
vere cuts made in public sector investment pro-
grammes, as well as to the growing uncertainty 
caused by the acceleration of the inflationary 
spiral and the prolonged and laborious efforts of 
the economic authorities to renegotiate the ex-
ternal debt and to enter into a stand-by agree-
ment with the International Monetary Fund. 
The gross domestic product also fell 
markedly (-4%) in Mexico, where economic 
activity had declined slightly in 1981, after 
having grown substantially over the previous 
four years. This contraction was mainly caused 
by the drastic reduction of domestic demand and 
of the volume of imports resulting from the re-
strictive policy applied by the government in 
order to strengthen the balance of payments and 
control the galloping inflation that had been un-
leashed during the preceding year. Although the 
implementation of this policy did succeed in 
halving the substantial public sector deficit of 
1982 and helped.to generate an impressive trade 
surplus, it also brought about considerable 
reductions in fiscal expenditure, private 
investment and wages, and a substantial increase 
in unemployment, with the resulting negative 
effects on domestic expenditure and the level of 
activity. 
The product declined even more steeply in 
Bolivia (-6%) and, particularly, in Peru (-12%); 
in 1983, these two countries suffered from a 
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singular combination of natural disasters, 
characterized mainly by torrential rains and 
flooding in some regions and prolonged and 
serious drought in others. In addition to these 
disasters, which had done great damage to agri-
cultural production, Peru was alsq affected by a 
change in the ocean currents which caused a 
sheer drop in the output of the fishing sector. In 
both countries, economic activity also suffered 
the impact of galloping inflation, and in Peru the 
volume of imports plummeted. 
The situation was similar, athough less se-
rious, in Ecuador, whose domestic product fell 
by 3.5% because fishing, agriculture and indus-
try in the coastal belt suffered the destructive 
effects of unusually heavy rains, flooding and 
tidal waves; inflation reached an unprecedented 
level (66%), and the quantum of imports 
brusquely contracted (—25%). 
Production and employment trends con-
tinued to be very unfavourable in Uruguay. Af-
ter having remained at a standstill in 1981 and 
fallen by almost 9% in 1982, the gross domestic 
product dropped by 5.5% in 1983. As in the 
previous year, this new decline was caused, in 
particular, by the substantial decreases in indus-
trial production, construction and commercial 
services and the very severe contraction yet again 
shown by the volume of imports, which shrank 
by 39%, after having dwindled by 30% in 1982 
and 14% in 1981. Also as in 1982, the decline of 
economic activity went hand in hand with a con-
siderable increase in unemployment. As shown 
in table 4 and figure 2, the unemployment rate in 
Montevideo, which almost doubled between 
1981 and 1982, continued to rise in 1983, exce-
eding 16% towards the middle of the year. 
During 1983, the level of economic activity 
also fell in Venezuela, whose gross domestic 
product is estimated to have dropped by around 
2%. Since it had remained virtually at a standstill 
since 1978, the per capita product decreased for 
the fifth year in succession. As in other countries, 
two major causes of the decline in economic 
activity were the sharp contraction in imports 
—the volume of which was reduced by 60%— 
and the increased uncertainty generated by the 
devaluation of the bolivar and the drastic modifi-
cations introduced in the exchange system, 
which came after a long period of a fixed 
exchange rate and virtually no restrictions on 
foreign currency transactions. 
In most of the Central American economies, 
too, the domestic product decreased. Neverthe-
less, the decline in economic activity was relative-
ly slight and fell far short of the temendous 
slumps previously recorded in some of these 
countries. This change was especially marked in 
Costa Rica —where the product fell by 0.5% in 
1983, after having dropped by around 5% in 
1981 and by 9% in 1982— and in Nicaragua, 
which managed to increase its product by 2%, 
thus offsetting the downturn it had experienced 
in 1982. On the other hand, the economy ex-
panded much more slowly (0.5%) in Panama, 
whose rate of growth in 1982 (5.5%) had been 
the highest in Latin America. 
In Chile, the sharp decline of economic activ-
ity, which had begun in mid-1981 and which in 
1982 had caused the gross domestic product to 
drop by over 14% and unemployment to risejust 
as sharply, was attenuated in 1983 (see table 2 
and figure 2). Although economic activity con-
tinued to fall during the first half of 1983, it 
tended to recover slowly after that, as a result of 
increased public expenditure, lower real interest 
rates, and the greater protection for activities 
competing with imports that was provided by the 
maintenance of a higher real exchange rate, the 
raising of the general tariff from 10% to 20% and 
the imposition of higher special tariffs on im-
ports of certain agricultural and industrial 
goods. Nevertheless, this recovery did not com-
pensate for the lag in economic activity during 
the first half of the year, and consequently, the 
gross domestic product dropped by around 0.5% 
over the year as a whole. In addition, although 
overt unemployment in Greater Santiago 
decreased almost constantly, from 25.2% during 
August-October 1982 to 17.7% a year later, this 
was mainly due to the expansion, during that 
period, of the emergency employment program-
mes carried out by the government, the produc-
tivity of which is generally low and in which 
wages are very low as well. 
The recovery of economic activity was much 
more marked in Argentina, where the product 
rose by 2%, thanks, in particular, to the fact that 
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Table 4 
LATIN AMERICA: EVOLUTION OF URBAN UNEMPLOYMENT, 
1973 T O 1983 




































































































































Source: ECLA and PREALC, on the basis of official statistics. 
a
 Federal Capital and Greater Buenos Aires. Average from April to October; 1983 April. 
b
 La Paz. 1978 and 1979 second semester; 1980 May to October; 1983 April. 
c
 Metropolitan areas of Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, Belo Horizonte, Porto Alegre, Salvador and Recife. Twelve-month 
average; 1980 average June to December; 1983 average January to September. 
d
 Bogota, Barranquilla, Medellin and Cali. Average for March, June, September and December; 1983 average for March, 
June and September. 
" National urban. Average for March, July and November; 1983. PREALC estimate, March to July. 
1
 Greater Santiago. Average for four quarters; 1983 average January to September. As of August 1983, information refers 
to the metropolitan area of Santiago. 
8
 Metropolitan areas of Mexico City, Guadalajara and Monterrey. Average for four quarters; 1982 and 1983 estimated 
annual average for the country as a whole, on the basis of figures supplied by the Secretariat of Labour. 
h
 National non-agricultural, except for 1978 and 1979, which refer to the urban sector. The Figure for 1980 refers to 
unemployment in the urban area recorded by the population census and the figures for 1981 and 1982, to the metropolitan 
area. 
' Asuncion, Fernando de la Mora, Lambarey, urban areas of Luque and San Lorenzo. 1983 official estimate. 
1
 Metropolitan Lima. 1978 average July to August; 1979 August to September; 1980 April; 1981 June; 1982 and 1983 
official estimates. 
k
 Montevideo. Average for two semesters; 1983 average for January to August. 
1
 National urban. Average for two semesters. 
industrial production increased by around 9%. 
Nevertheless, inasmuch as overall economic 
activiy had dropped by 11 % over the previous 
two years, while manufacturing production had 
fallen by almost 23% between 1979 and 1982, 
neither came close, in 1983, to recovering the 
levels reached in 1977. 
The gross domestic product of Colombia was 
only slightly higher (0.5%) in 1983 and the coun-
try's growth rate declined for the fifth year in 
succession. The main cause of the slowdown of 
the economy was the falling-off in industrial pro-
duction, which was affected by the sluggish 
growth ofdomestic demand and the reduction of 
exports to Venezuela and Ecuador, where Co-
lombian manufactures ceased to be competitive 
after the devaluation of the bolivar and the sucre. 
As a result of the decline of industrial production 
and despite the moderate growth of construc-
tion, unemployment rose for the second year in a 
row in the country's most important cities, 
reaching an average of 11%, the highest figure 
for the last nine years (see table 4 and figure 2). 
Finally, in 1983, economic activity expanded 
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Figure 2 
LATIN AMERICA: QUARTERLY EVOLUTION OF UNEMPLOYMENT 
IN PRINCIPAL CITIES 
(Unemployment rates) 
Rio de Jii»íiob 
Slo Pauto1 
/ \ Rourio* 
/AS A / ^ 
Capital and Greater Buenos Aires" 
I ' ' • I ' ' ' I ' • ' I ' ' ' • ' • ' • ' • ' 
19TT 197S 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Stn( i ig° d 
.' Mcdellf»G 
I I 1 I I I I I I I . I I I I I I 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1981 1983 
Source: ECLA on the basis official information. 
a
 Figures for April and October 1977 to 1981, Capital and Greater Buenos Aires; 1982, greater Buenos Aires. 
11
 Averages based on monthly data. 
I
 Figures for March, June, September and December. 
II
 Figures for March, June, September and December based on data supplied by the National Statistical Institute. 
L
' 1977 to 1981: half-yearly data. As of 1981: quarterly averages. 
1
 Figures for March (I), July (II) and November (IV) for San José, Cartago and Heredia. The figure for November 1979 is 
the national urban rate. 
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by 4% in both Cuba and the Dominican Republic, 
the only two countries of the region, besides Co-
lombia and Panama, that were able to raise their 
overall levels of production steadily over the last 
three years. 
2. Inflation 
Despite the decline of economic activity and the 
growth of unemployment, and notwithstanding 
the weakening of inflationary pressures from 
abroad, the rate of increase of prices continued 
to speed up in most of the Latin American 
economies, reaching a new record for the region 
as a whole in 1983. Indeed, the simple average 
rate of increase of consumer prices jumped from 
47% in 1982 to 68% in 1983, and the rate weight-
ed by the population rose even more sharply, 
from somewhat under 86% in 1982 to 130% in 
1983. 
The rate of inflation accelerated with par-
ticular virulence in Argentina, Brazil, Peru, 
Ecuador and Uruguay, and continued to be very 
high in Mexico and, especially, in Bolivia. On the 
other hand, it dropped dramatically in Costa 
Rica, fell moderately but steadily in Colombia 
and was very low in Barbados, the Dominican 
Republic and Panama (see table 5 and figure 3). 
Consumer prices continued to soar in 1983 
in Argentina, so that by the end of November 
their annual rate of increase was 400%, almost 
double the figure for the previous year and 
much higher than the rates recorded in 1975 and 
1976. As in previous years, this phenomenon was 
related to the existence of a considerable fiscal 
deficit and the spreading of increasingly neg-
ative expectations as to future price trends. Thus 
for the eighth time in the last nine years, inflation 
in Argentina reached a three-digit level. 
Inflation also crescendoed in Brazil. As a 
result of the swollen public sector deficit, the 
maxidevaluation of the cruzeiro in February, the 
continual subsequent increases in the exchange 
rate, the deterioration of expectations and the 
complex and generalized indexing system that 
was in force, consumer prices, which had risen at 
a rate of around 95% between 1980 and 1982, 
shot up by 175% during the twelve months 
ending in November 1983, while the general 
price index more than tripled in the same period. 
The acceleration of inflation was also excep-
tionally serious in Peru, while the annual rate of 
increase of consumer prices, after having fluctu-
ated around 70% in 1981 and 1982, rose to 
almost 125% in October 1983. This notable 
upswing was the result, in particular, of the much 
more rapid devaluation policy followed by the 
economic authorities up to August, as well as of 
the steep increase in food prices due to the 
effects of drought and floods. 
Although it was much lower in absolute 
terms than in Peru, Brazil and Argentina, in 
relative terms inflation rose more sharply in 
Ecuador. As shown in figure 4, between October 
1982 and October 1983 the annual rate of in-
crease of consumer prices more than tripled, 
rising from 20% to 66%. As in other countries, 
this acceleration of the inflationary process was 
largely attributable to the devaluations of the 
sucre that were enacted as from 1982, after a 
long period of stability in the exchange rate. In 
this case, however, a decisive part was also played 
by the decrease in the supply of agricultural prod-
ucts caused by floods. 
Inflation also rose constantly and steeply in 
1983 in Uruguay, where the rate of increase of 
prices, after having shown a steady downward 
trend between early 1980 and November 1982, 
turned sharply upward again after the devalua-
tion of the peso at the end of November 1982. 
Thus, the annual rate of inflation shot up to 63% 
in November 1983, almost six times the rate that 
had been reached immediately before the in-
crease in the exchange rate.2 
Inflation followed a different trend in Boli-
via, where, u p to October 1983, prices had risen 
at an annual rate (249%) that was lower than the 
rate recorded at the end of 1982 (296%). Never-
theless, the rate of inflation in Bolivia continued 
to be the second highest in the region. Moreover, 
as minimum wages were raised by over 70% in 
November and the exchange rate was increased 
2As inflation is expected to be considerably lower in 
December 1983 than ¡n.December 1982 (when prices rose by 
around 9% after the devaluation of the peso), the annual rate 
of increase of consumer prices will probably go down to 
around 55% at the end of 1983. 
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Table 5 
LATIN AMERICA: EVOLUTION OF CONSUMER PRICES, 
1975-1983 
(Variations from December to December) 
Country 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Latín America" 
Countries with tradition-
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Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, and official information supplied by the countries. 
a
 Totals for Latin America and partial figures for groups of countries represent average price variations by countries, 
weighted by the population in each year. 
b
 Variation between November 1983 and November 1982. 
c
 Variation between October 1983 and October 1982. 
d
 Up to 1980, figures represent the variation in the consumer price index for manual workers; from 1981 on, figures 
represent the variation in the total national CPI, including manual workers and employees, 
e
 Variation between July 1983 and July 1982. 
f
 Up to 1982, figures represent the variation in the consumer price index for the city of Quito; in 1983, the national total. 
g
 Variation between August 1983 and August 1982. 
h
 Variation between April 1983 and April 1982. 
' Variation between September 1983 and September 1982. 
J
 Variation between June 1983 and June 1982. 
k
 Variation between May 1983 and May 1982. 
18 CEPAL REVIEW No. 22 / April 1984 
Figure 3 
LATIN AMERICA: VARIATIONS IN CONSUMER PRICE INDEX 
OVER TWELVE MONTHS IN SELECTED COUNTRIES 
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1980 Ï$8Ï Î9Sl î?8l 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of official information. 
A PRELIMINARY OVERVIEW OF THE LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMY DURING 1983 / Enrique V. Iglesias 19 
Figure 4 
LATIN AMERICA: VARIATIONS IN CONSUMER PRICE INDEX 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of official information. 
by 150% during the same month, after having 
remained steady for a year, inflation can be ex-
pected, over the coming months, to exceed its 
already high level. 
In 1983, inflation also remained very high in 
Mexico, although it slowed down after the mid-
dle of the year. The annual rate of increase of 
consumer prices reached a record high of almost 
120% in July, but subsequently dropped almost 
steadily, so that it was 92% in November.3 This 
3For the same reason as in the case of Uruguay —in 
December 1982 consumer prices rose by almost 11 %— the 
annual rate of increase of consumer prices will probably have 
fallen to approximately 80% by the end of 1983. 
20 CEPAL REVIEW No. 22 / April 1984 
reversal of the inflationary trend was mainly due 
to the considerable reduction of the fiscal deficit 
and the very restrictive wage policy applied by 
the economic authorities. 
The reversal of the inflationary trend was 
much more definite and spectacular in Costa 
Rica, where, as in Mexico, the rate of increase of 
prices had risen with exceptional force in 1982. 
After having reached an unprecedented level of 
around 110% in September 1982, the rate of 
increase of consumer prices fell dramatically and 
persistently over the following months and in 
October 1983 dropped below 13% (see figure 4). 
The course followed by inflation in Chile was 
more complex in 1983. Indeed, between June 
1982 —when the peso was devalued after almost 
three years of stability— and June 1983, the 
annual rate of increase of consumer prices 
climbed steadily from 4% to somewhat over 32%. 
Nevertheless, as the effect on the cost of tradable 
goods produced by the sharp rises in the ex-
change rate which occurred during the second 
half of 1982 began to wane, and as real wages 
continued to fall, the rate of inflation began to 
slow down gradually after August 1983 and sank 
to under 24% in November. 
During 1983, inflation continued to decline 
gradually but constantly in Colombia, the Latin 
American country that has had the most stable 
rate of increase in prices over the last ten years. 
This reduction in the intensity of the inflationary 
process occurred despite the fact that the author-
ities had stepped up the rate of increase of the 
minidevaluations of the peso in order to 
strengthen the balance of payments. The in-
creased inflationary pressure that this might 
have brought to bear was neutralized, however, 
by the slow growth of domestic demand. 
Among the countries that have traditionally 
had moderate rates of inflation and in which the 
variations in the domestic level of prices have 
usually tended to follow those of international 
inflation, the rate of increase of consumer prices 
rose slightly in El Salvador and at a higher rate in 
Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago and, especially, 
Paraguay. The rate continued to decline, on the 
other hand, in Barbados, Panama, the Domini-
can Republic and Venezuela. 
3. The external sector 
In 1983, Latin America made a tremendous 
effort to reduce the disequilibria that had been 
accumulating in the external sector since the late 
1970s. Thus , to the higher exchange rates 
adopted by numerous countries of the region in 
1982 were added, in 1983, new devaluations, 
various other measures aimed at controlling im-
ports and encouraging exports, and strict fiscal, 
monetary and wage policies directed towards re-
ducing domestic expenditure. 
As a result of these adjustment policies, and 
despite the unfavourable trends in world trade 
and external financing, in 1983 the region 
achieved a huge surplus in its merchandise trade, 
and notably reduced not only its current-account 
deficit but also the deficit on the balance of pay-
ments (see tables 6 and 7). 
a) External trade and the terms of trade 
However, the 1983 surplus of over US$ 31 
billion was only achieved through a drastic 
reduction of imports, which dropped by almost 
29%, after having fallen by 20% in 1982. Since 
the unit value of imports did not vary in 1983 and 
since it had decreased slightly in 1982, the 
contractions in the volume of imports were just 
as pronounced as those in their total value (see 
table 8). 
The large-scale reduction in both the value 
and the volume of external purchases was, 
moreover, a widespread phenomenon. In 1983, 
the volume of imports fell by over 10% in every 
country of the region except Bolivia, Costa Rica, 
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua and the 
Dominican Republic. But even in these coun-
tries, where the volume of imports rose, the in-
crease did not offset the substantial reductions 
that had taken place in 1982. 
In countries such a Venezuela, Uruguay, 
Mexico, Peru, Argentina and Chile, the contrac-
tion of the volume of imports was so spectacular 
as to reveal clearly the enormous magnitude of 
the adjustment effort that had been made. Thus, 
the quantum of imports fell by 60% in Vene-
zuela; declined by 39% in Uruguay and by 36% 
in Mexico, after having already dropped by 30% 
and 41%, respectively, in 1982; decreased by 
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Table 6 
LATIN AMERICA: TRADE BALANCE 













































































































































































































































































Source: 1981, 1982: International Monetary Fund; figures for Ecuador (1982), El Salvador (1982), Guyana (1982), 
Nicaragua (1981, 1982) and Trinidad and Tobago (1982)', are EIH.A estimates. Figures for Chile for 1981, 
1982 and 1983: Central Bank of Chile. 1983: ECLA, provisional estimates subject to revision. 
27% in Peru and declined by 17% in both Argen-
tina and Chile, in both of which imports had 
already fallen by around 40% in 1982. 
In contrast, the volume of exports rose by 
7% in the region as a whole and by 9% in the 
non-oil-exporting countries. As was the case with 
respect to the real decline of imports, the in-
creases in the volume of exports mainly reflected 
the adjustment effort made by the Latin Amer-
ican economies through measures aimed at mod-
ifying relative prices for tradable and non-
tradable goods and reducing domestic expendi-
ture. 
Nevertheless, the unfavourable evolution of 
world trade, for a fourth year in succession, and 
the drop in the international prices of oil and 
other commodities prevented this increase in the 
volume of exports from bringing about a similar 
increase in their value. Indeed, the value of ex-
ports fell slightly in the region as a whole and by 
almost 6% in the group of oil-exporting coun-
tries (see table 9). 
Table 7 
LATIN AMERICA: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
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29 068 












































































on cu r r en t 
account* 
1981 
- 4 0 370 
- 1 2 791 
- 3 1 2 
- 1 0 2 7 
- 1 4 075 
- 1 810 
407 
4 026 
- 2 7 579 
- 4 7 1 2 
- 1 1 3 
- 1 1 760 
- 1 895 
- 4 0 7 
- 4 805 
- 2 6 6 
- 5 6 7 
- 1 7 9 
- 2 2 5 
- 3 2 1 
- 5 7 1 
- 4 9 6 
- 3 7 8 
- 4 1 6 
- 4 6 8 
1982 
- 3 6 396 
- 9 506 
- 1 2 1 
- 1 0 7 0 
- 3 122 
- 1 823 
44 
- 3 4 1 4 
- 2 6 890 
- 2 477 
- 4 2 
- 1 6 3 1 4 
- 2 291 
- 2 0 6 
- 2 372 
- 2 4 0 
- 3 7 6 
- 1 6 6 
- 1 4 2 
- 2 4 9 
- 3 9 3 
- 5 3 9 
- 3 9 1 
- 4 5 7 
- 2 3 5 
1983 
- 8 460 
7 050 
- 1 9 0 
- 5 9 0 
3 700 
- 1 340 
410 
5 060 
- 1 5 510 
- 1 900 
- 7 660 
- 1 780 
- 4 0 0 
- 1 0 9 0 
- 2 3 0 
- 2 7 0 
- 1 6 0 
- 1 7 0 
- 2 2 0 
- 5 3 0 
- 3 7 0 
- 2 5 0 
- 3 9 0 
- 9 0 
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- 6 800 
- 2 5 0 
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- 1 700 
1 370 
- 1 210 
- 5 500 
1 1 2 7 0 
1 9 0 0 
6 280 















- 2 332 
97 
7 
- 3 7 1 
456 
- 6 7 2 
698 
- 2 1 
- 2 429 
- 3 193 
- 1 2 
621 
433 
- 4 9 
137 
- 4 9 
- 3 0 2 
- 2 6 
- 5 7 
- 7 2 
106 





- 1 9 827 
- 1 1 141 
32 
- 3 2 8 
- 2 885 
- 7 0 
276 
- 8 166 
- 8 686 
- 6 7 0 
7 
- 5 193 -
- 6 4 4 -
125 
- 1 345 
- 7 0 
- 3 8 
- 6 
- 4 5 
- 4 5 
- 1 2 3 
- 1 4 
- 6 2 
- 1 4 6 
- 4 1 7 
1983 
- 3 990 
250 
- 4 4 0 
- 1 0 0 
2 0 0 0 
30 
- 8 0 0 
- 4 4 0 
- 4 240 
0 
- 1 380 
-1 950 
- 1 0 0 
- 6 5 0 
110 
- 1 0 
- 1 0 
- 1 0 
- 2 0 
- 2 0 
0 
- 1 0 0 
- 5 0 
- 5 0 
Source: 1981, 1982: International Monetary Fund; the figures for Ecuador (1982), El Salvador (1982), Guyana (1982), Nicaragua (1981, 1982) and Trinidad 
and Tobago (1982) are provisional estimates prepared by EC:LA and are subject to revision. Figures for Chile (1981, 1982 and 1983): Central Bank. 
1983: ECLA, provisional estimates subject to revision. 
" Excluding net payments for profits and interest. 
* Including net unrequited private transfer payments. 
c
 Including long- and short-term capital, unrequited official transfer payments and errors and omissions. 
d
 Variation in international reserves (with inverted sign) plus counterpart entries. 
A PRELIMINARY OVERVIEW OF THE LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMY DURING 1983 / Enrique V. Iglesias 23 
Table 8 
LATIN AMERICA: IMPORTS OF GOODS 

























































































































































































































































































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of official statistics. 
a
 Provisional estimates subject to revision. 
Although the fall in the international price of 
hydrocarbons had a lot to do with the drop in the 
unit value of exports in 1983, this was also due to 
the decline of the international prices of some of 
the region's major export commodities, such as 
coffee and sugar, and several minerals. More-
over, the substantial increases in the internatio-
nal prices of bananas, cocoa, maize, fish meal, 
wool and copper did not in any way, except in the 
case of bananas, offset the tremendous reduc-
tions in the prices of these commodities in previ-
ous years (see table 10). 
Since the unit value of exports fell much 
more than that of imports, Latin America's terms 
of trade declined by slightly over 7%, after hav-
ing fallen by 5% in 1982 and by 7% in 1981 (see 
table 11). As in 1982, the decrease in the terms of 
trade was more pronounced in the oil-exporting 
countries than in the other economies of the 
region. Nevertheless, since the terms of trade of 
the latter had already deteriorated sharply over 
the last five years, not only was the relevant index 
around 30% lower in 1983 than in 1978, but it 
reached the lowest level of the last half-century. 
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Table 9 
LATIN AMERICA: EXPORTS OF GOODS, 1981 TO 1983 
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Source: ECLA. on the basis of official statistics. 
a
 Provisional estimates subject to revisión. 
Indeed, during the period 1980-1983, it was 
much lower, on average, than it had been during 
1931-1933, the most critical period of the Great 
Depression. Among the oil-exporting countries, 
on the other hand, the deterioration in the terms 
of trade during the last two years did not offset 
the remarkable advance that had been made du-
ring the biennium 1979-1980. Thus, in all these 
economies except Peru, the termsof-trade index 
was still much higher in 1983 than in any of the 
non-oil-exporting countries; in all the oil-
exporting countries taken together, the terms of 
trade were 16% higher than in 1978, the year 
preceding the second series of sharp rises in the 
international price of hydrocarbons. 
The new decline in the terms of trade meant 
that in 1983, the purchasing power of Latin 
American exports came to a complete standstill, 
even though the volume of exports had in-
creased by around 7%. Their volume grew even 
more (9%) in the non-oil-exporting countries, 
thus marking the resumption of the vigorous 
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Table 10 
PRICES OF MAIN EXPORT PRODUCTS, 1981 TO 1983 
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- 1 . 2 
- 6 . 5 
18.0 
16.8 






- 6 . 5 
12.2 
3,4 
- 6 . 6 
-20 .6 
- 3 . 3 
-11 .2 
- 1 1 . 3 
- 7 . 8 
Source: UNCTAD, Monthly Commodity Price Bulletin, Supplements 1960-1980 and September 1983; International 
Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, Yearbook 1981 and October 1983. 
a
 Average January to August. 
b
 Dollar cents per pound. 
c
 Dollars per metric ton. 
d
 Dollars per pound. 
c
 Average January to July. 
1
 Dollars per barrel. 
8
 Average January to May. 
growth which had taken place since the begin-
ning of the 1970s and which had been inter-
rupted in 1982 (see figure 5). Also as a result of 
this increase in the volume of exports, the pur-
chasing power of the exports of this group of 
countries rose by 6.5% in 1983. However, this 
did not come near to compensating for the de-
cline of previous years. 
The volume of exports grew much less (2.5%) in 
the oil-exporting countries and did not offset the 
impact of the deterioration of their terms of 
trade which fell by around 7.5%. Consequently, 
the purchasing power of their exports fell, for 
the second year in a row, by approximately 4% 
(see table 12). 
b) The balance of payments 
Because the value of imports decreased, 
much more than that of exports, the merchan-
dise trade balance underwent another significant 
change in 1983. After the radical turnabout of 
1982, when the US$ 1.6 billion deficit of 1981 
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Table 11 
LATIN AMERICA: TERMS OF TRADE, 1975 TO 1983 


































































































































































































































































































Source; ECLA, on the basis of official statistics. 
3
 Provisional estimates subject to revision. 
b
 Cumulative percentage variations for the period. 
had been replaced by a surplus of over US$ 9.7 
billion, 1983 brought an extraordinary increase 
in the trade surplus, which amounted to over 
US$ 31 billion, more than three times that of the 
previous year. This was, in particular, the result 
of the enormous increases in the trade surpluses 
of Venezuela, Brazil and Mexico, and of the evo-
lution of merchandise trade in Argentina, Chile, 
Peru, Ecuador and Uruguay. In Venezuela, the 
trade surplus of over US$ 9.3 billion almost tri-
pled that of 1982, despite the fact that, as in 1982, 
the value of exports fell significantly. 
In Brazil, on the other hand —where the 
merchandise trade surplus increased eightfold 
bertween 1982 and 1983, from US$ 780 million 
to US$ 6.3 billion— the improvement was due 
both to an increase in exports and to a decrease in 
imports. Mexico, which in 1982 had already 
managed to convert its US$ 4.1 billion deficit of 
1981 into a surplus of almost US$6.9 billion, 
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Figure 5 
LATIN AMERICA: TRENDS OF SOME FOREIGN TRADE INDICATORS 
(Indexes: 1970 = 100) 
Oil-exporting countriesb Non-oil-exporting countries1. 
^
 6
 450 , - ,450 
» ' Terms of trade 
Purchasing power of 
exports of goods 
^ ^ ^ . Quantum of exports 
of goods 
Latin America3 
1971 75 80 83 1971 75 80 83a 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of official information. 
a
 19 countries. 
b
 From 1970 to 1975, includes Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela; from 1976 on, also includes Mexico and Peru. 
c
 Fiom 1970 to 1975, includes 16 countries. From 1976 on, Mexico and Peru are no longer included. 
d
 Provisional estimate. 
raised its positive trade balance to US$ 12 billion, 
thanks to the fact that imports again fell very 
substantially and that exports remained almost 
unchanged. The trade balances of Chile and 
Uruguay evolved on much the same lines as that 
of Mexico, although the absolute amounts of the 
changes were much lower. Thus, after having 
had a deficit of nearly US$ 2.7 billion in 1981 
and having achieved a small surplus in 1982, 
Chile recorded a surplus of around US$ 1 billion 
in 1983; during that same period, Uruguay 
transformed a deficit of US$ 360 million into a 
surplus of US$ 460 million. In both countries, 
however, this change in the trade balance was 
brought about solely as a result of the radical 
contraction in the value of imports, which be-
tween 1981 and 1983 fell by 56% in Chile and by 
62% in Uruguay. 
The contraction of imports was also the main 
cause of the new increase in the trade surplus 
achieved by Argentina, the bigger surplus 
obtained by Ecuador and the substitution by 
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Table 12 
LATIN AMERICA: PURCHASING POWER OF EXPORTS OF GOODS, 1975 TO 1983 
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4 
11 
- 2 7 
- 3 4 
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- 3 6 
- 5 0 
- 3 4 
- 1 9 
- 5 6 
- 3 4 
- 3 3 
- 1 6 
1 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of official statistics. 
a
 Provisional estimates subject to revision. 
b
 Cumulative percentage variations for the period. 
Peru of a small surplus for its deficit of the pre-
vious year. 
By contrast with what happened in 1982, 
when the impact of the change in the trade bal-
ance on current account was neutralized, to a 
large extent, by the sharp increase in payments 
for interest and profits, in 1983 the part played 
by the increased trade surplus in reducing the 
imbalance on current account was reinforced by 
a decline in financial remittances. Such pay-
ments, which had more than quadrupled over 
the previous five years, rising from US$ 8.6 bil-
lion in 1977 to almost US$ 36.8 billion in 1982, 
fell to a little under US$ 34 billion in 1983. This 
was a result of the limitation on remittances of 
profits caused by the sharp contraction of 
domestic economic activity and the slight decline 
in interest payments brought about by the reduc-
tion of nominal interest rates on the internation-
al financial market. Under these circumstances, 
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the deficit on current account —which in 1982 
had already dropped by 10%, after having 
reached a record high of US$ 40 billion in 
1981— fell spectacularly to under US$ 8.5 bil-
lion in 1983. Almost all the countries of the re-
gion contributed to this outcome, either by vigor-
ously reducing their current-account deficits; or, 
as in the case of Mexico and Venezuela, by re-
placing deficits by large surpluses; or, as hap-
pened in Trinidad and Tobago, by increasing 
their surpluses. The only exceptions to this 
general trend were Bolivia, Costa Rica, Haiti 
and Nicaragua, which showed bigger current-
account deficits than in the previous year. 
Nevertheless, the drastic reduction of the 
deficit on current account which took place in 
1983 was also due, to a very large extent, to a no 
less radical reduction, for the second year in a 
row, of net movements of capital. Between 1981 
and 1982, capital flows had already fallen from 
US$ 38 billion to US$ 16.6 billion and in 1983 
they dropped to under US$ 4.5 billion. 
As in 1982, the net total of investments and 
external loans was much lower than net pay-
ments for interest and profits, which meant that 
in 1983 Latin America transferred real resources 
abroad to an amount of almost US$ 29.5 billion, 
46% more than the already very substantial sum 
transferred in 1982. 
In 1983, the net inflow of capital was also 
smaller than the deficit on current account, a 
situation which had already occurred in both 
1981 and 1982. Consequently, the global balance 
of payments closed with a deficit for the third 
year in succession. Although the total of slightly 
under US$ 4 billion was equivalent to one-fifth 
that of 1982, it was over 70% higher than the 
negative balance in 1981 (see table 7). 
Table 13 
LATIN AMERICA: TOTAL EXTERNAL 
DEBT, 1981 TO 1983 


































































































Source: ECLA on the basis of official statistics and publications 
of international financial agencies. 
a
 Provisional estimates subject to revision. 
b
 Public debt. 
c
 Includes officially guaranteed public and private external 
debt, plus non-guaranteed long- and short-term debt with 
financial institutions reporting to the Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements. 
d
 Total public and private external debt. 
c) The external debt 
According to very provisional estimates, by 
the end of 1983 the total external debt of Latin 
America amounted to approximately US$ 310 
billion. It is estimated to have grown by about 7% 
during the year, a rate that was much lower than 
the 12% of 1982 and far below the growth rate of 
around 23% which was the average during the 
period 1977-1981 (see tables 1 and 13). 
This sharp drop in the growth rate of the 
debt was mainly the result of the restrictive policy 
adopted by the international commercial banks 
with respect to Latin America. In 1983, these 
banks granted virtually no new autonomous 
loans to the region, channelling their credit 
through the renegotiations of the external debt 
initiated by several Latin American countries.4 
4
 Between August 1982 and the end of 1983, all the 
countries appearing in table 13, except Colombia, El Salva-
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Under such circumstances, a substantial part of 
the increase in the debt was accounted for by the 
fact that the banks capitalized interest payments. 
This was partly due to the pressure brought to 
bear by the International Monetary Fund to in-
duce the banks to refinance part (usually around 
50%) of the interest earned, as a contribution to 
dor, Guatemala, Haiti, Panama and Paraguay, requested a 
rescheduling of their external debt payments. Cuba and 
Jamaica did so likewise, but are not shown in the table because 
the necessary information was not available. For a detailed 
analysis of the renegotiation of the external debt, see Part I of 
the Economic Survey of Latin America, 1982. 
the adjustment programmes sponsored by the 
Fund. 
The need to refinance a considerable por-
tion of the interest payments becomes obvious 
when one takes into account the tremendous 
burden which they represent for most of the 
countries of the region. Indeed, despite the fact 
that in 1983 interest payments fell, mainly as a 
result of the slight decline in the prevailing rates 
on the main international financial markets, they 
still amounted to the equivalent of 35% of the 
value of exports of goods and services for the 
region as a whole (see table 14). Although this is 
somewhat lower than the 38% which they repre-
Table 14 
LATIN AMERlCA:RATIO OF TOTAL INTEREST PAYMENTS 



















































































































































































Source: 1977-1982: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payment's Yearbook; 1983: E<XA, on the basis of official 
information. 
' Interest includes interest payments on short-term debt. 
b
 Provisional estimates suject to revision. 
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sented in 1982, it was higher than the propor-
tions recorded between 1977 and 1981 and 
much higher than the 20% which is usually con-
sidered an acceptable ceiling. The percentage of 
export earnings which had to be devoted to inte-
rest payments in 1983 was considerably more 
than the average in Argentina (51%), Brazil 
(44%) and Costa Rica (44%). On the other hand, 
it was much lower than the average in El Salvador 
(10.5%), Guatemala (7.5%) and Haiti (3.5%). 
Il l 
External financing and the 
real transfer of resources 
The abrupt adjustment of the balance-of-
payments current account which took place in 
1983 was enforced, to a large extent, by the no 
less violent contraction of the net inflow of capi-
tal. Indeed, in 1983, the total inflow of capital 
was barely one-fourth of that received in 1982 
—which had already been very low— and only 
15% of the average inflow of capital during the 
four-year period 1978-1981 (see table 15). The 
negative impact of this sharp drop in the net 
inflow of capital becomes even more obvious 
when one compares the amount of capital re-
ceived with the value represented by net pay-
ments of interest and profits, which in 1983 ex-
ceeded, for the second year in a row, that of net 
loans and investments received. Consequently, 
as in 1982, instead of receiving a net transfer of 
real resources from abroad, Latin America made 
Table 15 
LATIN AMERICA: NET FINANCING AVAILABLE AFTER PAYMENT 
OF PROFITS AND INTEREST, 1973 TO 1983 









































































































Source: IMF Balance of Payments Yearbook (several issues); and ECLA estimates, on the basis of official statistics. 
' Obtained by deflating column 3 by the United States wholesale price index, base 1983 = 100. 
b
 In percentages. 
c
 Provisional estimates subject to revision. 
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a net transfer of resources to the rest of the world. 
Thus, a situation was provoked which, consider-
ing the relative development of the region, may 
be described as perverse. 
The amounts involved in this transfer were 
very large: US$ 20 billion in 1982 and almost 
US$ 30 billion in 1983, i.e., magnitudes equiv-
alent to 19% and 27% of the value of exports of 
goods and services and between 2.5% and 4% of 
the gross domestic product. Considered from 
another angle, the reversal in the direction of net 
financial payments which took place between 
1981 and 1983 was equivalent to a deterioration 
of the terms of trade by almost one-third. 
The deflection of net financial flows was a 
decisive cause of the widespread contraction of 
economic activity in Latin America and of the 
difficulties which some countries experienced in 
servicing their external debt. As may be clearly 
seert in table 15, up to 1981 the gross amount of 
capital received by the region was well in excess 
of its amortization payments, investments 
abroad and remittances of interest and profits. 
During the period 1973-1981, this transfer of 
resources was equivalent, on average, to 16% of 
the value of exports, which, in turn, increased 
during that period at an annual rate of around 
20%. Under such circumstances, Latin America 
was able to make amortization and interest pay-
ments on its external debt and on profits earned 
by foreign capital by means of the new loans and 
investments it received each year. 
The magnitude of this net transfer of re-
sources began to lessen in 1979, when the in-
creases in the net inflow of capital were more 
than offset by the even larger increases in pay-
ments on interest and profits. This trend 
reached a peak in 1982-1983, when the net in-
flow of capital plummeted and the region had to 
meet the bulk of its payments for interest and 
profits from resources originating in the trade 
surplus or the international reserves it had pre-
viously accumulated. Because of the unfavour-
able external situation, however, the trade sur-
plus was not produced by an increase in exports, 
but rather by an extremely severe contraction of 
imports, and this in turn had a negative effect on 
economic activity. Owing to this chain reaction, 
the drastic reduction in the net inflow of capital 
ultimately affected the levels of production and 
employment. 
In turn, the fundamental cause of the de-
cline in net loans and investments which took 
place over the last two years was the procyclical 
reaction of the international commercial banks 
—Latin America's main creditors— vis-à-vis the 
unfavourable external situation with which the 
region was faced. This attitude was clearly evi-
denced for the first time in 1982 and persisted in 
1983. Thus, according to figures provided by the 
Bank for International Settlements, new loans 
granted by private banks to Latin America (ex-
cluding Venezuela and Ecuador) fell from 
US$ 21 billion during the second half of 1981 to 
US$ 12 billion during the first half and barely 
US$ 300 million during the second half of 1982. 
During the first six months of 1983, the 
banks granted loans amounting to US$ 3.7 bil-
lion. Nevertheless, this improvement was not the 
result of a 'spontaneous' response on the part of 
the banks but rather was accounted for by the 
fact that the banks were pressured by the Inter-
national Monetary Fund to contribute to the 'res-
cue packages' designed by that institution to 
facilitate the adjustment process in a number of 
Latin American economies. 
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IV 
Final conclusions 
1. The unique profile of the 
Latin American economic crisis 
The figures given above show the unusual scope 
and depth of the recessive crisis which almost 
every Latin American country is experiencing 
and leave no doubt that, for the region as a 
whole, 1983 was the worst year in the last half 
century. For most of the countries, the reduction 
of income during the period 1982-1983 has 
meant going back to the standard of living of 
several years ago. 
It is true, of course, that in many cases the 
crisis was partly the result of domestic factors 
related to ill-advised economic strategies or poli-
cies, the prolonged application of which was 
facilitated by the accelerated growth of external 
indebtedness and by the international financial 
permissiveness that prevailed during the 1970s. 
It is no less true, however, that the serious 
balance-of-payments crisis with which Latin 
America has been faced in recent years may be 
attributed, to a large extent, to external causes 
which by their very nature are beyond the con-
trol of the countries of the region. Cases in point 
are the spectacular drop in the terms of trade, 
the high nominal and real interest rates and the 
severe contraction of the net inflow of private 
capital. Even more unpredictable have been the 
intensity and the duration of this phenomenon, 
situation which is clearly atypical by comparison 
with what has happened in the large central 
countries during previous recessions. 
In any event, it is obvious that at this stage of 
the game, the solution to some of the most se-
rious problems besetting the region will depend 
mainly on external factors over which the region 
has little or no control. That is why the domestic 
economic policy options open to the countries 
are so complex and fraught with difficulties, and 
that is also why the prevailing atmosphere today 
is one of uncertainty and perplexity. 
In o r d e r to dea l with the balance-of-
payments crisis, many Latin American countries 
implemented, as from 1982, drastic and painful 
adjustment measures whereby imports were re-
duced so dramatically that in many cases the 
volume of imports fell by over 50% during the 
last two years. In addition, the sharp devalua-
tions made by many countries in order to balance 
their external accounts contributed to the rein-
forcement of inflationary pressures, which led 
after a time to the application of stabilization 
policies. Thus, the recessive effect which is nor-
mally produced by such policies over the short 
term was added to that produced by the pro-
nounced decrease in imports. The combination 
of these factors had another serious conse-
quence: investment slumped, and in some coun-
tries a significant proportion of installed capital 
deteriorated or was destroyed, as many enterpri-
ses went out of business. 
The social consequences of the current situa-
tion have been no less serious. Indeed, in many 
countries, employment and real wages have fall-
en to the lowest levels since the Great Depression, 
and, in some cases, have nearly reached the criti-
cal limits of social tolerance. 
In some countries the situation has been 
further aggravated by exceptionally severe natu-
ral disasters, which have accentuated the loss of 
income and the slowdown of the economy caused 
by the general crisis. 
Nevertheless, not everything was negative in 
1983. Some countries which had already follo-
wed cautious policies with respect to foreign debt 
were better able to cope with the adverse effects 
of the international situation. Many others have 
implemented programmes aimed at adjusting 
their balance of payments and in this effort have 
received some co-operation from the internatio-
nal financial community; this has prevented the 
immediate effects of the crisis from being still. 
Moreover, a relatively calm atmosphere has been 
restored on the immediate financial scene; this, 
of course, does not mean that the problems have 
been solved or that the risks of acute financial 
crises have been eliminated. 
These and other features of the situation 
show that the Latin American recession has a 
profile of its own and that the position in Latin 
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America is different from that in other regions of 
the Third World and, as matter of fact, from any 
similar situation that has arisen since the Second 
World War. 
2. The questions of the moment 
Latin America has undoubtedly shown a remark-
able sense of responsibility in the way that it has 
responded to the challenges posed by the current 
external crisis. Suffice it to recall that in the last 
few years many of the countries implemented 
sharp real devaluations with a view to promoting 
their exports, substituting domestic production 
for essential imports and eliminating non-
essential imports. To reduce domestic over-
spending and fiscal deficits, they have also sub-
stantially raised the prices of many public utilities 
and reduced a number of subsidies. 
Nevertheless, these measures —which, of 
course, are not easy to implement, politically 
speaking, and which were oriented towards real-
locating resources to the production of tradable 
goods— were taken on the assumption that a 
reactivation of the international economy would 
facilitate exports and bring back the terms of 
trade and interest rates to levels closer to those 
which had been normal in the past. 
Unfortunately, this was not the case. 
Although 1983 saw the beginning of a recovery 
in the leading central economy, this has not bene-
fited Latin America through any of the above-
mentioned mechanisms. Moreover, over the last 
few years, and especially in 1983, the region has 
been affected by yet another unfavourable 
change on the external scene: the drastic reduc-
tion of the inflow of capital, the effect of which 
has been equivalent to a deterioration of the 
terms of trade by one-third. 
Hence domestic adjustment had to be reces-
sive in nature and was based on an unpre-
cedented reduction of imports —even essential 
ones— and not on an increase in exports. Thus, 
precisely at the worst time —during an interna-
tional recession— the region was obliged to 
generate a substantial trade surplus, to become 
a net exporter of resources to the central coun-
tries, and to accept additional and exceedingly 
burdensome costs in order to be able to refinance 
part of the external debt it had accumulated. 
It therefore seems only natural that, as 1983 
comes to a close, we should ask ourselves the 
following questions: What can Latin America ex-
pect, over the short term, of the current reactiva-
tion of the international economy? How long can 
the indispensable domestic reactivation be post-
poned if the present situation of the internation-
al economy continues to prevail? After the pro-
found traumas of the last few years, will moder-
ate rates of economic recovery be adequate to 
deal with the acute social problems that have 
arisen as a result of the recession of the last three 
years? 
i) What international economic recovery? Inter-
national public opinion views the economic re-
covery of the United States with satisfaction, but 
also points to the contradictions and puzzles 
posed by the phenomena which accompany it. 
On the one hand, the so-called 'locomotive' 
theory, according to which the United States 
economy would be dynamic enough to pull along 
the other industrial centres, shows no sign of 
having been confirmed at this juncture. There 
are, moreover, still three elements that are vital if 
the international recovery is to have any signifi-
cant effect on the countries of the periphery and, 
in particular, on the Latin American economies. 
In the field of trade, the terms of trade of 
Latin America have continued to deteriorate 
—with some exceptions— during 1983 and no 
substantial increase in commodity prices seems 
to be in sight in the near future. Furthermore, as 
a result of certain well-known phenomena, some 
of which have to do with the high level of real 
interest rates, protectionist trends in the central 
countries have persisted and even increased; this 
detracts from the transparency and dynamism of 
international trade and particularly hinders the 
growth of new exports. 
In the financial field, real interest rates con-
tinue to be very high, as a result of many factors, 
to wit: the fact that the governments of some 
industrial countries have resorted to the finan-
cial systems to cover their substantial fiscal def-
icits; the nature of the anti-inflationary policies 
applied in the large central economies; the disap-
pearance of the liquid surpluses of the oil-
exporting countries', the pressure to attract sav-
ings in order to cope with new capital-intensive 
investment; and others. Thus, hardly anyone 
thinks that in 1984 there will be any considerable 
reduction of real interest rates, a matter which is 
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of fundamental importance to the management 
of the external debt of the developing countries. 
In the field of capital transfers, there has 
been a drastic reduction in the net inflow of 
capital, which, after having reached an unpre-
cedented level of US$ 38 billion in 1981, fell to 
barely US$ 4.5 billion in 1983; this drop would 
have been even greater had not the International 
Monetary Fund prevailed on the commercial 
banks to increase somewhat their loans to Latin 
America. 
The behaviour of these variables in the reac-
tivation process is fundamental to the viability of 
the current adjustment processes. It should be 
reflected that if the terms of trade had been 
similar in 1983 to what they were in 1980 (25% 
higher) and if at the same time real interest rates 
had been similar to those prevailing when the 
bulk of the debt was contracted (on average, 4 
points lower than at present), the region would 
have had US$ 25 billion more during 1983; with 
this amount it could easily have met its commit-
ments without having to reduce its imports so 
drastically and without having ro resort to new 
external borrowing. In other words, if normal 
conditions were restored in the areas of trade 
and finance, Latin America would be able to 
meet its external commitments without having to 
sacrifice its potential for growth. 
ii) Latin America cannot continue to contract its 
economy. It must be made quite clear that the 
region cannot go on applying the current adjust-
ment mechanisms for much longer under the 
existing external conditions. This could lead, at 
least in some countries, to situations that would 
be difficult to control, both economically and 
socially, and could give rise to tensions which 
would jeopardize the very capacity of the econo-
mies to recover and hence to service their accu-
mulated debt on time. It is relevant, therefore, to 
ask what the main limitations of the current 
adjustment processes are. 
In recent years, the region has had to carry 
out what essentially amounts to a twofold adjust-
ment. The first and better-known is the adjust-
ment to the extremely unfavourable trend in the 
terms of trade and in real interest rates. The 
second has been the adjustment aimed at dealing 
with a more recent but no less serious develop-
ment, i.e., the massive withdrawal of the net in-
flow of private capital. Thus, because the con-
traction of international trade and the 'financial 
depression' have occurred simultaneously, the 
region has not only had to adjust but has had, in 
actual fact, to 'overadjust'. 
Because the net inflow of capital shrank so 
enormously and payments for profits and in-
terest were so high, Latin America —for the first 
time in 1982 and again and to a greater extent in 
1983— made net transfers of resources abroad 
which amounted to USf 20 billion and US$ 29 
billion respectively. This situation, which con-
trasts sharply with what had historically been the 
case in the developing countries, has become a 
key element in the profound depression in Latin 
America and one which will also be a decisive 
factor in the establishment of any economic re-
covery policy to be pursued in the future. 
There are also other factors which have con-
tributed to the aggravation of the balance-of-
payments problems. Among these, special men-
tion should be made of the high costs and the 
bank surcharges that are involved in the renego-
tiation process, which have been added to the 
negative effects of the high interest rates. This 
increase in the financial costs —which contrasts 
with past experience and with the crisis measures 
normally applied in the case of any enterprise— 
has aggravated external imbalances and has 
meant that virtually all the cost of adjustment has 
been transferred to the debtor countries. In-
deed, this procedure is tantamount to an abdica-
tion, on the part of the international commercial 
banks, of their share of the responsibility for 
triggering the payments crisis with which the 
region is now faced. 
Latin America cannot prolong the current 
process of recessive adjustment; instead, what it 
needs is to carry out a growth-oriented adjust-
ment. In so far as it must for some time generate 
a trade surplus, it will have to achieve this by 
increasing exports —i.e., by resorting to a factor 
that helps raise the rate of economic growth— 
rather than by again reducing imports, which 
would only make the recession worse. 
3. The indispensable reactivation 
One of the most puzzling questions of the mo-
ment is the prevailing uncertainty about the 
possible modalities and prospects of internation-
al reactivation. However, if the current situation 
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with respect to prices of raw materials, real in-
terest rates and transfers of private capital were 
to continue, two different courses would prob-
ably be followed by the economies of the region 
in 1984. Some countries whose external situation 
is better and whose domestic adjustment pro-
grammes have been relatively successful could 
see a modest recovery in their economic growth 
rate. But because the service of their external 
debt would represent such a heavy burden, they 
would have little room left for the recovery of 
domestic expenditure and hence of employment 
levels. Other countries which face more difficult 
external circumstances and, in addition, have to 
struggle with heavy inflationary pressures, might 
witness a persistence of recessive trends, and this 
would aggravate the critical economic and social 
situation that has prevailed in them in recent 
years. 
In actual fact, neither the first of these op-
tions nor much less the second is acceptable. 
What Latin America needs is a firm and vigorous 
reactivation policy. Indubitably, however, any 
recovery process aimed at strengthening the de-
teriorated regional economy will be conditioned 
by both external and internal factors. Among the 
former, the most important and the one which, 
in the last analysis determines, over the short 
run, the room for manoeuvre which most of the 
Latin American governments will have for im-
plementing economic reactivation policies is the 
rescheduling of the external debt. Over the 
medium term, on the other hand, the key ele-
ment for enabling Latin America to achieve 
rapid and persistent economic growth is the ex-
pansion of its external trade, both within the 
region and with the rest of the world. 
Two of the internal factors that shape the 
effort to put more dynamism into the economy 
seem to be dominant: firstly, making reactivation 
programmes compatible with the abatement of 
inflationary pressures, both traditional and re-
cent; secondly, the restructuring of growth pat-
terns over the medium term required in order to 
achieve, among other objectives, a substantial in-
crease in the region's export capacity. This 
second factor is, moreover, the essential requisite 
for enabling the region to make the service pay-
ments on its accumulated debt on time. 
It is important to stress, however, that not all 
the Latin American countries are in the same 
situation as regards the servicing of the debt 
under the current adjustment mechanisms; 
moreover, the unfavourable international situa-
tion does not affect all of them in the same way. 
That is why it would be very difficult to arrange 
for a joint rescheduling of Latin America's exter-
nal debt. 
Nevertheless, in view of the absolute necessi-
ty of conditioning debt servicing to the require-
ments of domestic recovery and economic de-
velopment, the time seems to have come, for 
many countries, to make global proposals for 
changes in the existing rescheduling mechan-
isms. To this end, joint action should in our opi-
nion be undertaken, in accordance with the pro-
posals made by the Group of 24, to promote, in 
international fora such as those afforded by the 
International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank, measures to improve not only the existing 
international financial mechanism but also the 
international environment in which the adjust-
ment processes are carried out. 
It would be equally to the point for the coun-
tries of the region jointly to put before the inter-
national financial community certain minimum 
conditions that must be met in the immediate 
future in connection with the adjustment proces-
ses, until such time as the conditions on the inter-
national commercial financial markets improve. 
These conditions should include, among others, 
the following: 
— in no case should a country devote to the 
servicing of its external debt resources 
amounting to more than a prudent percent-
age of its export earnings, such as will enable 
it to maintain the minimum level of imports 
compatible with its economic recovery and 
development; 
— it should be advocated that the cost of mak-
ing adjustments be distributed more evenly 
by drastically reducing the current financial 
costs that are added to the high interest rates. 
Consideration should also be given to the 
possibility of using provisional mechanisms, 
similar to the interest rate subsidies which 
were studied during the 1960s, especially for 
international loans from public sources, and 
which considerably alleviated the financial 
burdens, of such vital importance in the cur-
rent adjustment process; 
— amortization periods should be extended 
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considerably in order to prevent in future 
the persistence of a perverse transfer abroad 
of resources; 
— firm commitments should be secured with a 
view to obtaining additional resources which 
will provide for the financing of a higher 
proportion of interest payments, facilitate 
the expansion of trade in the countries of the 
region, and ensure thé financing of satisfac-
tory levels of domestic investment. In this 
regard, renewed support for the efforts of 
the World Bank, the Inter-American De-
velopment Bank and other regional finan-
cing agencies will be of fundamental import-
ance. 
In recent times, long-term global solutions 
have been proposed which have not yet been 
given proper attention by the large financial cen-
tres of the world. Nevertheless, if the current 
international situation were to continue much 
longer, the force of circumstances might make 
some of these alternatives viable. In particular, it 
would be worth while to consider the possibility 
of converting a substantial part of the accumu-
lated debt into long-term bonds, with real in-
terest rates near to historical levels and with 
grace periods for their servicing to begin. This 
would enable the countries to gain time for 
undertaking the necessary domestic adjustments 
and for the measures aimed at increasing their 
export and import-substitution capacity to take 
effect. 
In any event, the management of the debt 
under existing international circumstances pre-
sents the region with a difficult dilemma. On the 
one hand, to eliminate the perverse transfers of 
resources abroad so as to sustain domestic reac-
tivation programmes, it would be necessary to 
obtain new net credits which would raise the 
already high level of the existing external debt; 
on the other hand, in order to meet part of the 
debt service with resources generated through a 
trade surplus, it would be necessary, in default of 
a significant increase in exports, to reduce yet 
again the already low volume of imports, and this 
would militate against any effort to reactivate the 
economy. That is why, over the short term, any 
effort that is made in this regard must provide 
for both an inflow of new resources and a sub-
stantial abatement of financial costs. 
The current preoccupation with the prob-
lems pertaining to the management of the exter-
nal debt has led the countries to overlook the 
close linkage that exists between their debt and 
their trade problems. In the last analysis, the 
final solution to existing and future balance-of-
payments problems can be found only by ex-
panding trade and increasing export income. To 
achieve this, it will of course be necessary to in-
crease the countries' export capacity; however, it 
will likewise be necessary to create an interna-
tional environment in which the markets for 
Latin American exports can be expanded and 
their prices can be improved. The protectionist 
practices that are being increasingly applied in 
the central countries certainly do not make it easy 
for these conditions to be met. 
Concomitantly with the contraction of Latin 
America's trade with the rest of the world, there 
has been a sharp deterioration of regional trade 
and a recrudescence, in no few Latin American 
countries, of defensive measures of a protection-
ist nature prompted by the difficult balance-of-
payments situation that almost all these countries 
are facing. 
This state of affairs must not continue. In 
order to reverse it, the first necessary step would 
be to call a halt to the imposition of new measures 
that hinder intra-regional trade, and the second, 
to adopt various measures of a preferential type, 
such as ad hoc agreements of limited scope or the 
utilization of State purchasing power. To this 
end, it will also be essential for the existing regio-
nal financial mechanisms to be expanded and for 
a more imaginative role to be enacted by Latin 
American financial institutions, some of which 
are already implementing programmes to sup-
port the expansion of intra-regional trade. 
These and other joint policies that might be 
adopted by the region in present circumstances, 
in order both to promote collectively the adop-
tion of measures at the international level and to 
accelerate regional co-operation movements and 
pursue them in greater depth, were analysed at a 
meeting which, at the invitation of the President 
of the Republic of Ecuador, was held in Quito in 
January 1984, and was attended by Heads of 
State and their personal representatives at the 
ministerial level. (See the Quito Declaration and 
Plan of Action in this same issue of the Review.). 
In the very near future the region will have 
to deal with a series of factors that will force it to 
